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Jurisdiction Over a Corporation Based on
the Contacts of a Related Corporation:
Time for a Rule of Attribution
[A] corporation as such never transacts business and is never
found anywhere, but does "transact business" and is 'found"
somewhere by attribution to the corporation of what human be-
ings do for it.'
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,2 recognizing the fiction of "presence" as it related to
corporations, formulated a more realistic constitutional basis for ju-
risdiction-"minimum contacts."'3 The Court stated the new theory
of jurisdiction as follows:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'4
The historical justification for a court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant was the defendant's presence within the terri-
tory of the state in which the court was located.5 This idea of "pres-
ence" as a basis of jurisdiction, however, did not work well
conceptually with corporate defendants. 6 Unlike a natural person
whose corporal presence can theoretically be determined at any point
in time, the corporate person has no such clearly definable presence.
The corporation, as an entity separate from its employees and share-
1. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 820 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Id. at 316.
4. Id. Although International Shoe dealt with a corporate defendant, the Supreme
Court spoke in terms of "defendants" not "corporations" in articulating the new minimum
contacts test. Consequently, the minimum contacts test has been applied equally to both corpo-
rate and individual defendants.
5. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), in which the Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Field, said: "Every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory ... and no state can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons or property without its territory." Id. at 722.
6. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
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holders, is a fiction, "although a fiction intended to be acted upon as
though it were a fact."7 Consequently, a corporation can only act,
and thereby establish contacts, through human beings who are au-
thorized to transact business on behalf of the corporation.8 The term
"presence" as it related to corporations merely symbolized those ac-
tivities and contacts of the corporation's human agents.9
Although the Supreme Court in International Shoe chose to use
the term "agent" rather than "employee," 10 the Court did not di-
rectly address the issue of whose contacts may be attributed to a
corporate defendant in order to establish the necessary minimum
contacts. This issue arises when jurisdiction over an out-of-state"l
corporation is sought based on activities performed by a related' 2 in-
state 3 corporation. This fact situation can occur in one of three
ways. First, the plaintiff can seek to establish personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state parent corporation based on the contacts of its
in-state subsidiary.' 4 Second, the plaintiff can seek to establish per-
sonal jurisdiction over an out-of-state subsidiary corporation based
on the contacts of its in-state parent." Third, the plaintiff can seek
to establish personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state subsidiary cor-
poration based on the contacts of its in-state sister-subsidiary.' 6
When faced with this issue, courts have often resorted to theories
other than that of "minimum contacts," such as the alter ego17 and
7. Id. at 316 (citing Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930)).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 316-17.
10. Id. at 317. From the opinion, it appears that the Court did not use the term "agent"
in a legal sense. Instead, the Court used "agent" simply to mean one who acts for and on
behalf of another by authority from him. The term "agent" is much broader in scope than the
term "employee," which the Court could have used based upon the facts of the case.
11. As used in this Comment, "out-of-state" refers to corporations that are not incorpo-
rated in the forum state, have no principal place of business in the forum state, and are not
registered to do business in the forum state. The term "in-state" refers to corporations that are
incorporated in the forum state, are admittedly doing business in the forum state, or are regis-
tered to do business in the forum state.
12. As used in this Comment, "related" refers to corporations that are connected
through the ownership of stock by a parent corporation.
13. See supra note II.
14. As used in this Comment, "subsidiary" is a corporation in which another corpora-
tion, a parent, owns at least a majority of the shares and thus has control. For the purpose of
this Comment, there is no need to distinguish between wholly-owned and non-wholly-owned
subsidiaries.
See, e.g., United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. II1. 1982).
15. See, e.g., Jayne v. Royal Jordanian Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
16. See. e.g., Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Arrow Trading Co., Inc. v. Sanyei Corp. (Hong Kong), Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
17. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
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agency' 8 theories, to determine whether they should exercise juris-
diction. These other theories stem from substantive rules of liability,
rather than procedural rules of jurisdiction. As a consequence, they
focus the court's attention on the details of the corporate family rela-
tionship, such as the general commingling of affairs and operations,
rather than on the nature and quality of the contacts made by the
in-state corporation on behalf of the related out-of-state corporation.
As a general proposition, this Comment suggests that courts
should not limit the jurisdictional exposure of related out-of-state
corporations by, in essence, employing a higher jurisdictional stan-
dard based on theories of liability. Instead, the courts should analyze
this jurisdictional situation involving related corporations by using
the same "minimum contacts" theory employed in other personal ju-
risdiction cases. 19 There is, however, one exception to this proposition
in which a rational reason exists for the courts to apply a different
analysis. 0 This exception occurs when jurisdiction over an out-of-
state parent corporation is sought based on the activities of its in-
state subsidiary in an attempt to hold the parent liable for an act or
omission of the subsidiary."' Jurisdiction in this instance is sought in
order to pierce the subsidiary's corporate veil and expose the parent
shareholder to unlimited liability. 2 Because the parent's substantive
right of limited liability could be infringed through the exercise of
jurisdiction, courts should apply an alter-ego or agency theory 8 to
the jurisdictional issue to show that, in this particular situation, the
parent has lost its right to limited liability because of an abusive use
of the corporate form.24 Because of the rational basis for this excep-
18. See infra notes 79-108 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 4. To assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the
Supreme Court in International Shoe held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires a showing of certain minimum contacts with the forum state "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" 326 U.S. at 316. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
protection to both natural persons and corporate persons. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
20. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2 at 994-95 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir.
1977); Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1974); Indian Coffee Corp.
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 482 F. Supp. 1098 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Beary v. Norton-Simon, Inc.,
479 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Crow Tribe of Indians v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 406 F.
Supp. 738 (D. Mont. 1975).
22. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 146 (3d ed. 1983); N.
LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 14 (2d ed. 1971).
23. See infra notes 64-108 and accompanying text.
24. See N. LATTIN, supra note 22, § 14, at 73 ("[W]here 'the corporate devise has been
used to defraud creditors, to evade existing obligations, to circumvent a statute, to achieve a
monopoly, or to protect Knavery or crime,' courts have held that the corporation may not be
used for such ends." (quoting Professor Warner Fuller)).
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tion, this Comment limits its focus to cases in which the out-of-state
corporation is sued for its own actions or omissions.
When a court decides whether to exercise its adjudicatory au-
thority over an out-of-state corporate defendant, it normally applies
a two-step process.25 The court first looks to see if an applicable rule
of competence, such as the state's long-arm statute, authorizes the
court to exercise jurisdiction.26 The court then considers whether the
application of that rule comports with the constitutional require-
ments of the due process clause.27 For the purposes of this Comment,
no distinction will be made between these two steps. The method of
analysis under both steps is essentially the same and varies only by
degree depending on whether jurisdiction under the appropriate state
statute is accorded to the limits allowed under due process.28
25. Note, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909,
998 (1960).
26. Federal courts sitting in diversity determine whether a defendant is amenable to
service of process by referring to state law. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir. 1963).
See, e.g., Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392,
1396 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[PIlaintiff must show, first, that the state statute of the forum confers
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. ... ); Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d
391, 393 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We look first to Indiana's 'long-arm' statute .... "), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1642 (1986); Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The first
step of the [personal jurisdiction] inquiry is solely a matter of determining the reach of the
forum state's long-arm statute."); Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, 772 F.2d 1358,
1362 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The first question we take up is whether Wisconsin's long-arm statute
... can be used ... to haul Metallurgiki before a federal court in Wisconsin."); Bond
Leather Co. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg., 764 F.2d 928, 931 (Ist Cir. 1985) ("[Tlwo questions must be
answered affirmatively in order for a Massachusetts court properly to exercise in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: '(I) is the assertion of jurisdiction authorized by the
[Massachusetts long-arm] statute, and (2) if authorized, is the exercise of jurisdiction under
State law consistent with basic due process requirements mandated by the United States Con-
stitution?'" (quoting Good Hope Indus. v. Ryder Scott Co., 378 Mass. I, 5-6, 389 N.E.2d 76,
79 (1979)) (second brackets in original)).
But see Comment, Giving the Boot to the Long-Arm: Analysis of Post-International Shoe
Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Decisions, Emphasizing Unrealized Implications of the
"Minimum Contacts" Test, 75 Ky. L.J. 885, 910-22 (1987) ("[Tlhis Comment argues that a
[state] long-arm statute is not constitutionally mandated and that the search for an applicable
long-arm statute obscures inquiry into the real bases for jurisdiction." Id. at 910).
27. Two such clauses are found in the United States Constitution: one in the fifth
amendment that pertains to the federal government, and the other in the fourteenth amend-
ment that protects persons from state actions.
28. A state may choose to exercise its jurisdiction to the full extent of its powers under
the United States Constitution. Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952). Some long-arm statutes are mere expressions that the state will reach to the constitu-
tional maximum. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973 and Supp. 1988); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1985). Such "'constitutional maximum" statutes are hollow shells or
mere forms because the "content" of the statute offers no direct guidance regarding the types
of contacts relevant for jurisdictional purposes.
See Comment, supra note 26, at 923-32 (This article argues that a state must exercise its
adjudicatory authority to the extent allowed under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Additionally, the article argues that short-arm statutes, which prospectively cut
off the ability to adjudicate certain causes of action, are unconstitutional.).
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The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that if a defendant is not present within the territory of the state
asserting jurisdiction, the state may only sue the defendant if two
elements are established. First, the defendant must have minimum
contacts29 with the state resulting from an affirmative act by which it
"purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities
there and invoked the benefits and protections of the forum state's
laws. s" Second, an assertion of jurisdiction must not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."3' Together, these
two elements constitute the "minimum contacts" theory of jurisdic-
tion as set forth in International Shoe. Both elements must be met
for the state to constitutionally assert jurisdiction over an out-of-
state defendant. Jurisdiction can be denied on the basis of the second
element without making a prior determination of the first.3 2 This
Comment, however, deals only with the first of these two ele-
ments-minimum contacts.
The focus of this Comment is on the method of analysis applied
by courts when addressing the issue of whether an out-of-state cor-
poration is doing business of a sufficient nature and quality through
its related in-state corporation in order to establish minimum con-
tacts with the forum state. To place this issue and its related inquir-
ies into proper perspective, part II of this Comment presents a brief
29. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
30. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, the Supreme Court clari-
fied and qualified the "minimum contacts" test established in International Shoe. The heart of
the Hanson opinion is found in the following passage:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The
application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
Id.
31. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. "Once it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be con-
sidered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105
S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (1985). For a list of the relevant factors, see footnote 142.
32. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987),
exemplifies that both elements of the "minimum contacts" test must be met for a state to
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. In Asahi, the Supreme
Court Justices were split on the issue of whether the out-of-state foreign corporation had mini-
mum contacts with the forum state. Eight of the Justices, however, agreed that, because of the
specific facts of the case, it would have been unreasonable and unfair to exercise jurisdiction
over the corporate defendant. Consequently, even if the Justices had agreed on the minimum
contacts element, the assertion of jurisdiction would not have complied with the second ele-
ment because it would have offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Without compliance with both elements, jurisdiction over the out-of-state corporation could
not pass constitutional due process muster.
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historical background of the issue. In particular, Cannon Manufac-
turing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.33 is discussed in light of the great
impact that the case has had on the development of the law in this
area. Next, part III discusses the treatment of the issue in cases and
analyzes the various theories that courts have applied to the issue.
Finally, part IV suggests that courts should analyze the jurisdic-
tional issue involving related corporations by applying "a jurisdic-
tional rule of attribution"" in conjunction with the "minimum con-
tacts" test. The jurisdictional rule of attribution, as introduced and
proposed in this Comment, should be applied to determine whether
the contacts of the related in-state corporation could be attributed to
its related out-of-state corporation. This rule of attribution focuses
on whether the out-of-state corporation intended to transact business
through its related in-state corporation, rather than on the means
through which the business was transacted. If a court determines
that the in-state contacts could be attributed to the out-of-state cor-
poration, the court should then apply the "minimum contacts" the-
ory to determine whether the attributed contacts were of a sufficient
nature and quality to comply with the first element of the due pro-
cess analysis-establishing minimum contacts.
II. Historical Background
A. Constitutional Doctrines Prior to International Shoe
Historically, the law regarded corporations as creatures of the
state that created them, having no legal existence outside the state of
incorporation and, therefore, not subject to suit elsewhere. When,
in an expanding economy, it became clear that corporations were, in
fact, carrying on their activities in many states, the courts sought
theoretical justification for subjecting out-of-state corporations to the
jurisdiction of the states in which they operated.36 The first approach
to become widely adopted was the consent theory, both express and
33. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
34. See infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text.
35. Note, supra note 25, at 919.
36. The history of the theoretical justifications for rendering in personam judgments
against foreign corporations is long and complex. The prevailing theories were consent and
presence. For cases applying the consent theory, see St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S.
218 (1913); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 404 (1855). For cases applying the presence theory, see Bank of America v. Whitney
Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
See also Note, supra note 25, at 919-21; Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes
of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REV. 522, 527-35 (1956).
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implied.37 The courts that applied this theory argued that, because a
corporation has no inherent right to do business in another state,38 a
state could make "consent to be sued" a condition of the out-of-state
corporation's transaction of business in the forum. A second ap-
proach that was adopted to justify the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over an out-of-state corporation was the presence theory.39 The
courts applying this theory reasoned that a corporation doing busi-
ness in the forum state was also present in that state for jurisdic-
tional purposes. Regardless of whether a court chose to justify juris-
diction under a consent theory or a presence theory, the test was
whether the corporation was "doing business" in the forum state at
the determinative time.40
B. Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.
It was against this background that the United States Supreme
Court decided Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.41
in 1925. In the Cannon case, a North Carolina corporation, Cannon
Manufacturing Company, attempted to sue a Maine corporation,
Cudahy Packing Company, in North Carolina for breach of con-
tract.412 Cannon initiated the action by serving process on a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the defendant that was doing business in North
Carolina. The defendant moved for dismissal of the action for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff contended that the defendant par-
ent corporation was doing business through its in-state subsidiary
and, therefore, was present in the forum state.
The Court in Cannon recognized that the defendant's wholly-
owned subsidiary was present in North Carolina, that it had been
established as an "instrumentality employed to market [its parent's]
products within the state,"' s and that it was completely controlled
both commercially and financially by its parent. After acknowledg-
ing these facts, the Court drew two conclusions out of which have
stemmed the agency and alter-ego theories which courts apply when
analyzing this jurisdictional issue." First, the Court found that, al-
37. See supra note 36.
38. A corporation is not a citizen under the privileges-and-immunities clause of article
IV of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868). See also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at § 89.
39. See supra note 36.
40. Note, supra note 25, at 922; Foster, supra note 36, at 535.
41. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
42. Id. at 333.
43. Id. at 334.
44. See infra notes 64-108 and accompanying text.
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though the subsidiary was an "instrumentality," it was not an
"agent" of the defendant parent corporation."5 Second, the Court
concluded that the carefully maintained corporate separation be-
tween the parent and the subsidiary, "though perhaps merely formal,
was real" ' 6 and, therefore, would not be ignored in determining the
existence of jurisdiction.
The Cannon case has been widely cited as establishing the rule
that "mere ownership" of a subsidiary will not subject the parent to
the jurisdiction of the state in which the subsidiary is doing business
as long as formal corporate separateness between the parent and
subsidiary is maintained."" The current validity of Cannon, however,
is extremely questionable for two reasons. First, the Cannon case was
decided prior to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins," and, therefore, was not
based on constitutional due process grounds.49 Thus, the Supreme
Court in Cannon was interpreting what constituted "doing business"
under general federal common law. 50 Second, the Cannon case was
decided prior to International Shoe Co. v. Washington1 and, there-
fore, was constitutionally restricted by the old territorial due process
notion that a state could exercise jurisdiction only over those persons
present in the forum.52 Analyzed in this context, the holding of Can-
non is understandable because the only way the plaintiff could have
shown that the out-of-state corporation was present in the forum was
by establishing that its in-state subsidiary was really its alter-ego. In
light of these reasons, Cannon cannot presently be regarded as
mandatory precedent in any state.
45. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335. The Court failed to state which elements were necessary
to become an "agent" rather than merely an "instrumentality." It appears, however, that the
Court used "agent" in the legal sense according to the formal principles of agency law. Com-
pare this application of "agent" with the way the Court applied this term in International
Shoe. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
47. See Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations in New York: When Is Mere Ownership
Enough to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Parent?, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 681, 684 (1973).
48. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Prior to Erie Railroad, a federal court sitting in diversity ap-
plied the statutory law of the state in which it was sitting but was free to fashion its own
version of the common law. Consequently, a large body of "federal common law" developed
that the federal courts applied regardless of conflict with a state's common law. After Erie
Railroad, a federal court sitting in diversity applied the same substantive law, both statutory
and common law, that a state court in the state in which it was located would apply. See M.
GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE, 6-8 (2d ed. 1979).
49. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336 ("No question of the constitutional powers of the state, or
of the federal government, is directly presented.").
50. See Wellborn, supra note 47, at 684; Cardozo, A New Footnote in Erie v.
Tompkins: "Cannon Is Overruled", 36 N.C.L. REV. 181 (1958).
51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Wellborn, supra note 47, at 684; Comment, Jurisdiction
Over Parent Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 574 (1963).
52. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See also supra note 5.
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III. Analysis of the Various Jurisdictional Theories
Courts have varied greatly in applying the rule established in
Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co." that mere
ownership of a subsidiary will not subject the parent to the jurisdic-
tion of the state in which the subsidiary is doing business as long as
formal corporate separateness between the parent and subsidiary is
maintained. 54 Some courts have continued to strictly apply the Can-
non rule.5 5 Other courts have developed exceptions to the Cannon
rule. 56 Still others have applied the Cannon rule in conjunction with
a "minimum contacts" analysis. 57 Finally, several courts have de-
cided that the Cannon rule has been superseded. 58
A. Strict Application of the Cannon Rule: Insufficient Intercorpo-
rate Separateness Theory
Some courts continue to rely on Cannon as the controlling au-
thority in this area of the law even though it is not mandatory prece-
dent. 9 In Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz,60 for example, the plaintiff
was severely injured when he was pulled into textile machinery that
had been manufactured by an out-of-state subsidiary corporation.
The plaintiff, seeking to obtain jurisdiction over the out-of-state sub-
sidiary, contended that the in-state parent so dominated and con-
trolled its subsidiary that each was the alter-ego of the other. The
court, recognizing a distinction between piercing the corporate veil
for substantive purposes and piercing the corporate veil for jurisdic-
tional purposes, stated that the omnipresence of Cannon dictated
that the jurisdictional amenability issue turned on a disregard of cor-
53. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (D.S.C. 1979)
("[Cannon's] comments on intercorporate jurisdictional responsibility are still relevant to-
day."); Frito-Lay Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243, 247 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
("[T]his court has no reason to believe that the rule of Cannon is not still controlling where
applicable.").
56. See. e.g., Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(agency and mere department exceptions applied); Oostdyk v. British Airtours Ltd., 424 F.
Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (agency and mere department exceptions applied).
57. See, e.g., Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. II1. 1982); Pasquale
v. Genovese, 136 Vt. 417, 392 A.2d 395 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical Instruments Manufacturing Co., 593 F.
Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("The result of the change in standard is to render irrelevant
to our determination of personal jurisdiction any consideration of the alter ego principles of
corporate law discussed in Cannon."); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F.
Supp. 483, 495-511 (D.C. Kan. 1978) (case provides a "treatise" on the demise of Cannon).
59. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
60. 478 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1979).
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porate formalities.61 After an analysis of the interrelationship be-
tween the parent and subsidiary, the court concluded that separate
corporate formalities had not been maintained because the subsidi-
ary had no functioning board of directors.62 Holding the out-of-state
subsidiary subject to suit in the forum, the court stated that "if ob-
servation of all corporate formalities prevents subjecting the parent
to jurisdiction via the activities of the subsidiary - (or vice versa)
- then disregard of corporate formalities will void the protection." 3
B. Exceptions to the Cannon Rule: Alter-Ego and Agency
Theories
Other courts not so willing to exalt form over substance devel-
oped exceptions to the Cannon rule as a method of avoiding its lim-
ited and strict application. These exceptions are actually conceptual
theories that justify the exercise of jurisdiction in certain situations.
These theories can be roughly divided into two broad catego-
ries-alter-ego and agency. The alter-ego analysis disregards the for-
mal corporate separateness as purely fictional and declares the sub-
sidiary a mere department or instrumentality of the parent
corporation.6 The agency analysis, on the other hand, does not dis-
regard the corporate separateness but simply declares the subsidiary
to be the agent of the parent corporation or vice versa.65
With the International Shoe Co. v. Washington66 decision in
1945, courts no longer needed to apply these exceptions to the Can-
non rule. Courts could have avoided Cannon altogether by simply
employing the "minimum contacts" analysis set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe. Unfortunately, however, most courts have not realized
this and have continued to analyze the parent-subsidiary situation as
one governed by its own unique set of jurisdictional rules stemming
from the Cannon case.
1. Alter-Ego Theory.-The alter-ego theory, also known as
the mere department theory, stems from the judicial doctrine of
61. Id. at 1143 and 1143 n.13.
62. Id. at 1147. The court conceded that, even if the subsidiary had had its own board of
directors, the degree of control exercised by the parent would most likely have remained the
same.
63. Id. at 1146. It is interesting to note that by applying the Cannon rule, a court can
assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation without ever mentioning the words "mini-
mum contacts."
64. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at § 148.
65. id.
66. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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piercing the corporate veil. This doctrine is employed by courts when
the corporate form has been used for a purpose not permitted by the
legislative privilege of the corporate device.67 In such a situation, a
court will disregard technically correct corporateness, declare the
subsidiary the alter-ego of its parent corporation, and impose unlim-
ited liability on the parent shareholder. Piercing the corporate veil is
merely a conceptual way of saying that the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the corporate form-the limited liability of the sharehold-
ers-will not be honored.
68
Applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to a per-
sonal jurisdiction issue is not only unrealistic but also conceptually
inapplicable. The separate corporate entities are never actually disre-
garded. 'The parent and its subsidiary continue to exist as separate
and distinct corporations while the personal jurisdiction issue is be-
ing decided as well as after its disposition. In addition, corporations
have no special substantive privilege of limited amenability.6" Ac-
cordingly, there is no privilege to disregard or veil to pierce as there
is with the liability issue.
The issue of whether a corporation is doing business through a
subsidiary "may be treated as an entirely different question" from
that of loss of limited liability.70 Recognizing this, some courts have
attempted to lower the standard of proof when applying the alter-ego
doctrine for jurisdictional purposes and have developed what one
commentator called "quasi-substantive" rules of law." Even with a
lower standard, however, the alter-ego theory necessarily focuses on
67. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at § 146; N. LATTIN, supra note 22, at §
14.
68. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 22, at § 146, n.2 ("[Clourts simply will
not let interposition of corporate entity or action prevent a judgment otherwise required. Cor-
porate presence and action no more than those of an individual will bar a remedy demanded
by law in application to facts. Hence the process is not accurately termed one of disregarding
corporate entity. It is rather and only a refusal to permit its presence and action to divert the
judicial course of applying law to ascertained facts. The method neither pierces any veil nor
goes behind any obstruction, save for its refusal to let one fact bar the judgment which the
whole sum of facts requires." (quoting In re Clark's Will, 204 Minn. 547, 578, 284 N.W. 876,
878 (1939))).
69. See Wellborn, supra note 47, at 686 ("The amenability of corporations to suit in
other states is determined by the jurisdictional law of those states and the only limitations on it
• ..are federal due process limitations,").
70. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALIF. L.
REV. 12, 14 (1925). See also E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS: A
STUDY IN STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY 61 (1936) (maintaining that the policies behind veil-
piercing in the procedural context and veil-piercing in the substantive context are very
different).
71. Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Cor-
porations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33 (1986).
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the intercorporate family relationship, emphasizing factors such as
control," and does not focus on the quality and nature of the in-state
contacts made on behalf of the out-of-state corporation.
Marantis v. Dolphin Aviation, Inc." exemplifies this emphasis
on control as the determinative factor in jurisdictional questions. In
Marantis, a New York resident died in a plane crash in Florida
while piloting an aircraft manufactured by Beech Aircraft Corpora-
tion. The decedent's estate instituted a products liability action in
New York against Beech, arguing that Beech was doing business in
New York by virtue of having seven Beech retail distributors in the
forum state. The court, however, quickly pointed out that six of the
distributors were independently owned franchises and that only one,
East, was a wholly-owned subsidiary. Admitting that Beech dealt
with East in the same manner that it dealt with the other New York
franchisees, the court concluded that "what distinguishes East from
the other New York franchisees is the fact that it alone is a subsidi-
ary of Beech." '74 Directing its attention solely to the relationship be-
tween Beech and East and disregarding Beech's relationship with the
other six in-state distributors, the court stated that, in order to find a
parent doing business through its subsidiary, the parent's "control
over the subsidiary's activities . . . must be so complete that the sub-
sidiary is, in fact, merely a department of the parent."7 6 The court
decided that the relationship between Beech and East fell short of
the "corporate intimacy" required to conclude that the subsidiary
was a mere department of its parent.
Rea v. An-Son Corp.76 illustrates another variation of this juris-
dictional alter-ego theory. In Rea, the plaintiff was injured while
working aboard a drilling tender vessel in Venezuela and sued the
Venezuela oil drilling company for negligence. The plaintiff initiated
suit in Oklahoma based on the presence of the Venezuela company's
parent and grandparent corporations. In order to assert jurisdiction
over the Venezuela subsidiary, the court stated that it must find the
subsidiary to be the alter-ego of either its parent or grandparent cor-
72. This factor of control was regarded as inconsequential in Cannon. 267 U.S. at 335.
Hence, the alter-ego analysis with its emphasis on control is directly contrary to the Cannon
decision.
73. 453 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
74. Id. at 805.
75. Id. (quoting Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 278 N.E.2d 895,
897, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (1972)). In addition to disregarding Beech's contact with the six
franchised sales outlets, the court did not consider in its jurisdictional analysis the direct con-
tacts that Beech had with the forum state, such as business trips by Beech employees, a New
York bank account, and a New York transfer agent. Id. at 804 n.I.
76. 79 F.R.D. 25 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
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poration. The court, applying the same reasoning that it applied to
piercing the corporate veil for liability purposes, employed eleven
factors in making its jurisdictional determination." After analyzing
these factors, the court held that the related corporations had exer-
cised "sufficient control" over their subsidiary to enable the court to
disregard the separate identities of each. The court made this finding
even though the record was incomplete with respect to the degree of
control exerted over the out-of-state subsidiary and concluded that
"the legal test of liability is different and more stringent than the
test relating to the amenability of process and forum." 8
2. Agency Theory.-The agency theory stems from the sub-
stantive law of agency. 79 Agency law primarily establishes the rights
and liabilities between an agent, a principal, and third parties. An
agency is a consensual fiduciary relationship between the agent who
agrees to act for and under the direction or control of the principal. 80
The degree of control that the principal has over the agent deter-
mines more specifically the type of relationship involved. For exam-
ple, in an employer-employee relationship, the employer controls or
has the right to control the physical conduct of the employee in the
performance of his duties of employment.81 On the other hand, in an
employer-independent contractor relationship, the employer has no
77. Id. at 29-3 1. The eleven factors that the court analyzed in its jurisdictional determi-
nation are:
I. Whether the parent owns all the stock of its subsidiary;
2. Whether the parent and subsidiary have common directors and officers;
3. Whether the parent finances the subsidiary;
4. Whether the parent caused the subsidiary's incorporation;
5. Whether the subsidiary has inadequate capital;
6. Whether the parent pays the salaries or expenses of its subsidiary;
7. Whether the subsidiary has business other than that with its parent or a
sister subsidiary, or has assets other than that transferred to it by its parent or a
sister subsidiary;
8. Whether the subsidiary's directors and officers act independently in the best
interest of the subsidiary;
9. Whether the subsidiary observes the formal legal requirements necessary to
maintain intercorporate separateness, such as keeping separate corporate
minutes;
10. Whether the distinctions between the parent and subsidiary are disre-
garded or confused;
II. Whether the subsidiary has a full board of directors.
Id.
78. Rea, 79 F.R.D. at 31. Although the court recognized a distinction between the legal
test for liability and the test for amenability of process and forum, the court failed to establish
in what way the test for the jurisdictional issue differed. See also Rollins v. Proctor &
Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 n.13 (D.S.C. 1979).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957).
80. Id. at § I.
81. Id. at § 2.
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right of control over how the independent contractor performs its
work.82
The agency theory developed as an alternative justification for
holding a parent corporation liable for the acts of its subsidiary.
Courts applying this theory undoubtedly felt that it was conceptually
more realistic than the alter-ego theory because in reality the sepa-
rate entities are neither merged nor disregarded. 83 Every parent-sub-
sidiary relationship is, in a broad sense, an agency relationship be-
cause of the ever-present control factor that goes along with owning
all or a majority of the stock in another corporation. 4 Technically,
however, the parent-subsidiary relationship falls short of being a true
agency because of the parent's limited liability for the acts of its
subsidiary. Therefore, in order to find that a subsidiary is an agent
for its parent, the court must show something more than mere own-
ership of a majority of the outstanding shares of stock.85 The court
must show that the parent exercised its control by completely domi-
nating the subsidiary corporation.88
The agency theory has also been applied for jurisdictional pur-
poses.87 From the dicta in Cannon, courts have inferred that jurisdic-
tion over the parent corporation would have been extended in Can-
non if the subsidiary had been an agent of its parent, such as a
82. Id.
83. Realistically, however, there is no difference between the alter-ego and agency ratio-
nales. For the most part, the two theories are interchangeable. I W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 43.30, at 504 (rev. ed. 1983). See also Andrulonis
v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 183, 188 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Courts posit the 'agency' and
'mere department' theories of personal jurisdiction as separate principles, but in reality no
bright line separates the two.").
84. Comment, supra note 51, at 582. See also Case Comment, Jurisdiction Over a For-
eign Corporation on the Basis of Its Subsidiary's Activities in New York: Bulova Watch Co.
v. K. Hattori & Co., 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 91, 106 (1983); Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 403 (1955); Ballantine,
supra note 70, at 15; but see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1957) ("A corpora-
tion does not become an agent of another corporation merely because a majority of its voting
shares is held by the other.").
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1957).
86. W. FLETCHER, supra note 83, at § 43.30; see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 22, § 146, at 344 n.2 ("Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by
the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where
control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice." (quoting Cardozo,
J., in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway, 244 N.Y. 84, 94-95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926))).
87. See, e.g., Andrulonis v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Jayne v.
Royal Jordanian Airlines Corp., 502 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Bellomo v. Pennsylvania
Life Co., 488 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Roorda v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 481 F. Supp.
868 (D.S.C. 1979); Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Top Form Mills, Inc.
v. Sociedad Nationale Industria Applicazioni Viscosa, 428 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Oostdyk v. British Airtours Ltd., 424 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Baird v. Day & Zimmer-
man, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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company division.88 Because a subsidiary cannot become an agent of
its parent merely because of their corporate structure,89 courts began
to look beyond the parent-subsidiary form to the actual substance of
the relationship. 90 If a court found excessive parental control and
interference in the affairs of the subsidiary, the court would conclude
that the activities of the subsidiary could be imputed to the parent
for jurisdictional purposes.
The problem with applying the agency theory to a jurisdictional
issue is that, as with the alter-ego theory, the focus is on the rela-
tionship between the parent and the subsidiary and not on the qual-
ity and nature of the contacts with the forum state. Another problem
with the agency theory is that courts use the term "agent" indiscrim-
inately without ever delineating what factors need to be shown in
order to establish an agency relationship.91
The "jurisdictional agency" theory has also been widely used in
fact situations other than those involving related corporations. 92 It is
interesting to note that, in these cases, the courts do not dwell on the
control aspect of the relationship as they do in the parent-subsidiary
cases. In fact, some of these cases do not even mention control as a
factor,93 leading to the conclusion that control is not the determina-
88. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335. See supra note 45.
89. See supra note 85.
90. Comment, supra note 51, at 581.
91. Wellborn, supra note 47, at 695. See supra notes 10 and 45.
92. See. e.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 627 (1935) (out-of-
state individual subject to jurisdiction based on activities of agents that were admittedly doing
business in the forum state on behalf of the defendant); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.,
385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1967) (out-of-state corporations were subject to jurisdiction of
forum state based on the activities of non-profit membership organization which booked travel
tours on behalf of the corporate defendants); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d
239, 244 (2d Cir.) (non-resident manager of out-of-state corporation who had personal agents
in New York was subject to the forum state's jurisdiction), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966);
Felicia, Ltd. v. Gulf Am. Barge, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 801, 805-06 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Florida
partnership was properly subject to jurisdiction in Illinois in action for breach of contract
where contract was entered into by specific partners acting as agents of the partnership); Ar-
cata Graphics Corp. v. Murrays Jewelers & Distrib., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 469, 472 (W.D.N.Y.
1974) (defendant Delaware corporation subject to jurisdiction in New York where merchan-
dising association representing defendant acted in New York); City of Philadelphia v. Morton
Salt Co., 298 F. Supp. 723, 725 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (out-of-state corporation that does a substan-
tial portion of its business through a domestic distributor may be subject to the jurisdiction of
the forum state); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D.S.C.) (out-of-
state corporate defendant subject to jurisdiction in South Carolina due to presence of a distrib-
utor in the forum state), affd, 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v.
Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 18-19, 256 N.E.2d 506, 509, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 341-42 (1970) (out-
of-state individual defendant subject to jurisdiction in New York because of the presence of an
art gallery employee who placed bids on behalf of the defendant at an art auction).
93. See, e.g., Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966);
Arcata Graphics Corp. v. Murrays Jewelers & Distrib., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 469 (W.D.N.Y.
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tive factor in order to establish jurisdiction over a principal based on
the activities of its agent. This conclusion that control is not a neces-
sary element in the jurisdictional analysis is exemplified by a trilogy
of cases decided in New York between 1965 and 1967: Bryant v.
Finnish National Airline,9' Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International,
Inc.,95 and Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.98
In Bryant v. Finnish National Airline,97 the highest court in
New York found that the foreign98 airline was doing business in the
forum despite the fact that it did not operate its airplanes in New
York. The decision was based upon the fact that the airline main-
tained an office in New York, employed several people in New York,
and held a New York bank account and telephone listing. In empha-
sizing the quality of these contacts, the court concluded that the
New York office performed an essential function for the foreign cor-
poration through public relations and publicity work and, in general,
generating business for the Finnish airline.99
The court in Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,
00
relying on Bryant, held that a British hotel corporation was doing
business in New York based on services performed in New York by
a sister-subsidiary. The court did not mention the factor of control
and did not discuss the details of the intercorporate relationship be-
tween the two sister corporations. Rather, the court based its deci-
sion on the quality and nature of the in-state activities conducted for
the out-of-state defendant corporation. The court did not think that
the provision of services by a related corporation rather than a com-
pany branch was an important distinction. Additionally, the court
did not base its decision on the fact that the two corporations were
related and stated that "the fact that the two are commonly owned
is significant only because it gives rise to a valid inference as to the
broad scope of agency in the absence of an express agency
agreement." 1 '
1974); Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d
337 (1970).
94. 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
95. 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
96. 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967).
97. 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 NY.S.2d 625 (1965).
98. As used in this Comment, "foreign" refers to corporations that are not organized
under the laws of one of the states or territories of the United States. The term "domestic"
refers to corporations that are organized under the laws of one of the states or territories of the
United States.
99. Bryant, 15 N.Y.2d at 432, 208 N.E.2d at 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
100. 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
101. Id. at 538, 227 N.E.2d at 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
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The Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.1"' case, decided six
months after Frummer, took the prior decisions of Bryant and
Frummer one step further by establishing jurisdiction over two out-
of-state domestic0 3 corporations based on the in-state activities of
their independent contractor. The court did not discuss the details of
the relationship between the defendants and the independent con-
tractor, and disregarded as irrelevant the total lack of control that
the defendants had over the contractor.104 Based on the agency the-
ory set out in Frummer, the court held that the independent contrac-
tor acted as an agent for the out-of-state corporations. The court
established this "jurisdictional agency" relationship by looking at the
quality and nature of the in-state activities conducted on behalf of
the out-of-state defendants rather than looking to the formal rules of
agency.
The court applied the same analysis in all three cases despite
the fact that each involved a different type of relationship between
the in-state and out-of-state corporations. Three important conclu-
sions can be drawn from this group of cases. First, the quality and
nature of the in-state contacts made on behalf of the out-of-state
corporation should be the court's primary concern. Second, control is
not a determinative factor in a jurisdictional analysis. Third, the
means through which business is performed-employee, subsidiary,
or independent contractor-is also not a determinative factor in a
jurisdictional analysis.
The wisdom to be gained from this trilogy of cases has fallen,
for the most part, upon deaf ears." 5 A case exemplifying this is Top
Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad Nationale Industria Applicazioni Vis-
cosa.'06 Top Form Mills deals with two different jurisdictional fact
situations: one between a foreign parent corporation and its in-state
subsidiary, and the other between a foreign principal and its in-state
agent. The plaintiff brought an action against a manufacturer and a
freight forwarding company for the allegedly defective shipment of
twenty-three tons of Italian knit fabric. In finding that the foreign
manufacturer had a wholly-owned subsidiary admittedly doing busi-
ness in New York, the court stated that the parent-subsidiary rela-
102. 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967).
103. See supra note 98.
104. Gelfand, 385 F.2d at 119.
105. See, e.g., Andrulonis v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Top
Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad Nationale Industria Applicazioni Viscosa, 428 F. Supp. 1237
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Baird v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
106. 428 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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tionship necessitated "a close factual scrutiny" of the nature of the
business done by the subsidiary on behalf of its parent, as well as of
the intercorporate connections and dealings between the two corpo-
rations.1"' In deciding the issue involving the principal and its agent,
however, the court limited its analysis solely to the contacts made by
the in-state agent on behalf of the foreign principal. 10 8 In both fact
situations, the court held that the out-of-state defendant was amena-
ble to jurisdiction in New York on the basis of an agency theory. In
so doing, the court applied the same "theory" to both jurisdictional
issues but a different "analysis" to each.
The Frummer, Gelfand, and Top Form Mills cases, as well as
the comparison between cases that apply the agency theory to par-
ent-subsidiary situations and those that apply it to other types of
situations, illustrate an important point. The term "agent" as used in
the jurisdictional sense does not indicate a particular method of
analysis and standard of proof, but is merely a term that courts have
used indiscriminately to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state corporation.
C. Alternative Application of the Cannon Rule and the Minimum
Contacts Test: Stream of Commerce Theory
The Supreme Court decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson 09 caused many courts to finally realize that the means
through which business is conducted is irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes."' Although the jurisdictional issue in World-Wide Volk-
107. Id. at 1242.
108. Id. at 1246.
109. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
110. See, e.g., Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical Instruments Manufacturing Co., 593
F. Supp. 107, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("[Tjhe fairness requirements of due process do not extend
so far as to permit a manufacturer to insulate itself from the reach of the forum state's long-
arm rule by using an intermediary or by professing ignorance of the ultimate destination of its
products." (quoting DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3d Cir.
1981))); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 320 (D.
Md. 1983) ("Due Process does not require that the contacts the [foreign] manufacturer has
with the forum state be directly created and maintained by the manufacturer .... "); Lasky
v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1225, 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("The fact that
Nissan conducts its marketing and distribution in the United States through an independent
distribution system does not shield it from the imposition of in personam jurisdiction in Penn-
sylvania."); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354, 359 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
("Recent decisions . . . emphasize that purposeful exploitation of the forum's market rather
than the means through which this is carried out is the relevant fact."); Graco, Inc. v. Krem-
lin, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 188, 193 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Because SKM receives substantial eco-
nomic benefit from its regular activity within the state, it can be said to be 'doing business'
here even though its dealings here are indirect.").
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swagen did not involve related corporations,"' the "stream of com-
merce" dicta in the opinion has been readily applied by courts to the
jurisdictional situation involving related corporations."' The Court
in World-Wide Volkswagen stated that "a forum State does not ex-
ceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forum State.""1 3 This is true regardless of
whether the out-of-state corporation "directly or indirectly" delivers
its products into the market of the forum state." " The stream of
commerce theory that evolved from World-Wide Volkswagen is a
particularized version of the minimum contacts theory because
courts apply the rationale only in cases involving a manufacturer
whose goods are somehow distributed to jurisdictions other than the
jurisdiction in which the goods are manufactured.
In Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc.," the court evaluated the juris-
dictional issue as it related to both the Cannon rule and the stream
of commerce theory. The plaintiff in Graco brought a patent in-
fringement " 6 suit against an out-of-state manufacturer and its in-
state wholly-owned subsidiary. The parent corporation manufactured
paint spraying equipment. Its subsidiary was the sole source of dis-
tribution of its products into the United States market. The court
first analyzed whether jurisdiction could be acquired over the parent
corporation under the Cannon rule. After briefly considering several
factors,"' the court concluded that the subsidiary acted as an inde-
11. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289. The jurisdictional issue in World-Wide
Volkswagen involved a regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation (World-
Wide), and a retail dealer, Seaway. World-Wide and Seaway were fully independent corpora-
tions whose relations with each other, as well as with the automobile's manufacturer and im-
porter, were only contractual.
112. See, e.g., Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical Instruments Manufacturing Co., 593
F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F.
Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Pa.
1983); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Coons v.
Honda Motor Co., 176 N.J. Super. 575, 424 A.2d 446 (App. Div. 1980).
113. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
114. Id. at 297.
115. 558 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
116. The applicability of the stream of commerce doctrine is not limited to products
liability cases. The stream of commerce theory can be applied in any type of action involving a
parent/manufacturer and subsidiary/distributor. See, e.g., Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical
Instruments Manufacturing Co., 593 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (stream of commerce the-
ory applied in a patent-infringement action); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba
Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983) (stream of commerce theory applied in a breach of
contract action); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(stream of commerce theory applied in an action to enforce two IRS summonses).
117. Graco, 558 F. Supp. at 191. The factors that the court analyzed in making its
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pendent corporate entity and, therefore, that jurisdiction over the
parent could not be based on the parent-subsidiary relationship.
Realizing that the Cannon rule had often been criticized, the
court in Graco alternatively analyzed whether jurisdiction over the
foreign parent could be asserted under the stream of commerce the-
ory. In doing so, the court emphasized the substantial economic ben-
efit derived by the out-of-state parent corporation through the sale of
its equipment to the in-state subsidiary. Dismissing as inconsequen-
tial the fact that the parent's contacts were only indirect,11 8 the court
concluded that the parent was in fact doing business and, therefore,
had minimum contacts with the forum state.
Unfortunately, some courts have not applied this stream of com-
merce theory of jurisdiction and have continued to go into the unnec-
essary and detailed analysis of the intercorporate family relationship
between the parent and its subsidiary. " 9 For example, the court in
Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co.' applied an agency-like the-
ory, better known as a complicated enterprise theory,' 21 to decide if
the out-of-state foreign corporation was amendable to suit in the fo-
rum state. At the end of a lengthy opinion' 22 that analyzed in great
detail the intercorporate relationship between the parent/manufac-
turer and its subsidiary/distributor, the court concluded that the es-
sential element in such a case is the benefit that the out-of-state for-
eign parent receives from the activities conducted by its in-state
subsidiary. 2 '
determination that the subsidiary acted as an independent corporate entity are whether the
parent arranges financing for and capitalization of the subsidiary; whether separate books, tax
returns, and financial statements are kept; whether officers or directors are the same; whether
the parent holds its subsidiary out as an agent; the method of payment made to the parent by
the subsidiary; and how much control is exerted by the parent over the daily affairs of its
subsidiary. Id.
118. Id. at 193. The means through which the forum's market was served, direct or
indirect, is not a relevant factor in a jurisdictional analysis. What is relevant is whether the
defendant intended to serve the forum's market.
119. See, e.g., Andrulonis v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 183 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Bulova
Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Cascade Steel Rolling
Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh and Co. (America) Inc., 499 F. Supp. 829 (D. Or. 1980).
120. 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
121. Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 71, at 30.
122. Compare Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (in a twenty-five page opinion, the court disposed of the personal jurisdiction issue by
applying an agency-like theory) with Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1225
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (in a one-page opinion, the court disposed of the personal jurisdiction issue by
applying the stream of commerce doctrine).
123. Bulova Watch, 508 F. Supp. at 1344-45.
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D. Shortcomings of the Various Jurisdictional Theories
The alter ego, agency, and stream of commerce theories all fall
short of offering an effective method for determining when the con-
tacts of an in-state corporation can be attributed to a related out-of-
state corporation for personal jurisdiction purposes. The alter ego
and agency theories fail because they do not directly address the
crux of the issue: whether the defendant purposefully established
minimum contacts in the forum state. Because they are conceptual
theories stemming from substantive rules of liability, they emphasize
the relationship between the related corporations rather than the in-
state contacts made on behalf of the out-of-state party. They dispose
of the jurisdictional issue via a circuitous route requiring unneces-
sary analysis into irrelevant aspects of the relationship between the
related corporations, which is a waste of time for the court as well as
the litigants.
The stream of commerce theory is ineffective because, concep-
tually, its applicability is limited to acquiring jurisdiction over a par-
ent/manufacturer through the activities of its subsidiary/distributor.
The jurisdictional issue involving related corporations is not, how-
ever, limited to the manufacturer-distributor fact situation. A sub-
sidiary can be employed to extend the parent's product line, 12 4 to
extend the parent's business into another geographic location,1 and
to provide services for the parent, a sister-subsidiary, 6 or both. 27
Additionally, a subsidiary can function as an investment for the par-
ent corporation.12 8
124. See, e.g., Rollins v. Proctor & Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1979); DCA
Food Industries Inc. v. Hawthorn Melody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Orefice v.
Laurelview Convalescent Center, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
125. See. e.g., Saraceno v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Titu-Serban lonescu v. E.F. Hutton
& Co. (France) S.A., 434 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Botwinick v. Credit Exchange, Inc.,
419 Pa. 65, 213 A.2d 349 (1965).
126. See, e.g., Gavigan v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1986);
Arrow Trading Co. v. Sanyei Corp. (Hong Kong), 576 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
127. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851,
281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
128. See, e.g., McPheron v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 390 F. Supp. 943 (D.
Conn. 1975); cf. Bellomo v. Pennsylvania Life Co., 488 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (case
offers a method for determining whether a parent holding company owns its subsidiaries for
investment purposes or whether the parent holding company is actually "doing business"
through its subsidiaries).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1988
IV. Proposal
A. Determination of the Essential Criteria for Attribution
It is clear from the cases analyzed in the preceding section that
in certain situations it is appropriate to attribute the activities of an
in-state corporation to a related out-of-state corporation. The prob-
lem, however, is pin-pointing those elements or factors that are es-
sential for such attribution.
1. Stream of Commerce Cases.-In analyzing cases that apply
the stream of commerce theory, both those that deal with related
corporations129 and those that do not,130 the determinative factor ap-
pears to be the intent of the out-of-state defendant corporation. In
United States v. Toyota Motor Corp.,' the court recognized that
purposeful availment of the forum's market was the relevant factor
and stated that "the fact that Toyota Japan's products reach the
United States through a wholly-owned subsidiary, rather than di-
rectly from the parent corporation, is inconsequential for due process
purposes. Instead, due process is satisfied so long as Toyota Japan
knew and intended that its vehicles would be sold here . . ,132
Another case involving a parent and subsidiary corporation con-
cluded that
Due Process does not require that the contacts the [foreign]
manufacturer has with the forum state be directly created and
maintained by the manufacturer, if the manufacturer indirectly,
but intentionally, introduces the goods into a market that in-
cludes the forum state, since the contacts then are not merely
fortuitous, but are intended."
Courts applying the stream of commerce theory of jurisdiction
have interpreted this intent requirement as stemming from the word
129. See, e.g., Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai Musical Instruments Manufacturing Co., 593
F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F.
Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Pa.
1983); United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
130. See, e.g., Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1278 (1984); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th
Cir. 1983); Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1982); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Oswalt v.
Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980); Rockwell International Corp. v. Costruzoioni Aer-
onautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
131. 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
132. Id. at 359 (emphasis added).
133. Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 320 (D.
Md. 1983) (emphasis added).
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"expectation" as it was used in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson."" At least two federal circuit courts have further inter-
preted the intent requirement to be purely objective, concluding that
the distinction between "known" and "should have known" is not
relevant in the jurisdictional analysis.135 The requisite intent can be
established by showing, first, that the out-of-state manufacturer
knew or should have known that the stream of commerce into which
it placed its goods would supply the market of the forum state and,
second, that the out-of-state manufacturer accepted the benefits of
the revenue derived therefrom.136
Because the policy behind limiting a state's adjudicatory au-
thority is one of fairness to the defendant,3 ' courts applying the
stream of commerce theory have realized that a determination of
what is fair turns in large part on the intent of the out-of-state man-
ufacturer. A manufacturing corporation that is profiting from the in-
tended sale of its products should not be allowed to insulate itself
from liability simply by avoiding direct contact with the forum. The
manufacturer's economic relationship with a state does not differ de-
pending on whether it distributes its products through a company
division, a subsidiary, or an independent contractor, and nor should
its amenability to suit.
134. 444 U.S. at 297-98. See supra text accompanying note 113.
135. Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A
manufacturer or supplier of a defective product who knew or should have known that a prod-
uct would enter the stream of commerce can be subjected, consistently with due process, to a
forum state's long-arm jurisdiction and be sued in the forum where the injury occurred.");
Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The ultimate test of in personam
jurisdiction is 'reasonableness' and 'fairness' and 'traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice[.]' In applying such a test, it is a matter of common sense that there should be no
distinction between 'known' and 'should have known.'" (citation omitted)).
136. See. e.g., Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1983)
("[A] manufacturer or primary distributor may be subject to a particular forum's jurisdiction
when a secondary distributor and retailer are not, because the manufacturer and primary dis-
tributor have intended to serve a broader market and they derive direct benefits from serving
that market."); Noel v. S.S. Kresge Co., 669 F.2d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Ohio exercises
personal jurisdiction over foreign sellers of goods even though there have been no direct sales
in Ohio so long as the seller receives a substantial amount of revenue from goods used in Ohio
and the seller might reasonably have expected the goods to be used there."); Copiers Typewrit-
ers Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 319-20 (D. Md. 1983) ("By its
efforts to serve the United States market, by placing its goods in the stream of commerce
which will supply that market, and by welcoming the sales and the revenue derived therefrom,
Toshiba evidences its intent that its goods reach the states of the United States, in which its
goods are sold.").
137. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181-82, 2182 n.13 (1985). In
Burger King, the Supreme Court stated that the restraints imposed on a state's adjudicatory
authority " 'must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved
by the Due Process Clause' rather than as a function of 'federalism concerns.'" Id. at 2182
n.13 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 n.10 (1982)).
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2. Burger King Case.-In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,138
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the out-of-state defendant's in-
tent is a critical factor in determining whether the assertion of juris-
diction over the defendant would be reasonable. The Court stated,
[W]here the defendant "deliberately" has engaged in significant
activities within a State, or has created "continuing obligations"
between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly has
availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and
because his activities are shielded by "the benefits and protec-
tions" of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable
to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that fo-
rum as well.139
The jurisdictional issue in Burger King involved a contractual
relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee. The franchisor,
Burger King Corporation, sued the franchisee, Rudzewicz, in the
franchisor's forum state for breach of franchise obligations and
trademark infringement. The Court stated that a contract with an
out-of-state party cannot alone establish minimum contacts in the
other party's home forum. Instead, the Court emphasized a "realistic
approach" whereby a court would look within, as well as without,
the contract to ascertain whether the defendant had sufficient con-
tacts in the forum state. 40 After analyzing the prior negotiations be-
tween the parties, the contemplated future consequences of the con-
tractual relationship, the terms of the contract, and the actual course
of dealing between the parties,""' the Court concluded that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction was "presumptively reasonable.' 42 The Court
found that "Rudzewicz deliberately reached out beyond Michigan
and negotiated with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-
term franchise and the manifold benefits that would derive from af-
filiation with a nationwide organization." 43  Consequently,
Rudzewicz's contacts were of a quality and nature such that he
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2184 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 2185.
141. Id. at 2186.
142. Id. Jurisdiction can only be "presumptively" reasonable prior to the consideration
of the in-state contacts in light of other relevant factors in order to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. Such relevant factors include the burden on the defendant, the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of
the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id. at 2184.
143. Id. at 2186.
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should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Florida.
A parent-subsidiary relationship is not unlike that of a
franchisor-franchisee relationship. The contract that bound the two
unrelated corporations in Burger King can be analogized to the stock
that binds two separate but related corporations. Conceptually, the
contract can be viewed as a marriage certificate"' and the stock as a
birth certificate. 1 5 The contract creates a voluntary relationship
analogous to husband and wife, and the stock creates a more sub-
servient relationship analogous to parent and child. Both certificates,
however, create a substantive legal relationship between the two cor-
porations. The primary difference between the two certificates is that
the stock certificate confers rights of ownership, including limited li-
ability, on the holder; whereas the contract does not confer any such
rights of ownership.
Because of these conceptual similarities between the franchisor-
franchisee and parent-subsidiary relationships, it is reasonable to
suggest that, if the Supreme Court were to address a jurisdictional
issue involving a parent-subsidiary relationship, it would apply the
Burger King analysis." 6 The Court would most likely reason that the
stock alone was not sufficient to establish minimum contacts with the
related corporation's forum. Recognizing that the stock, similar to
the contract, was only an indication that contacts exist between two
corporations, the Court would look beyond the stock to determine
whether the contacts were of a sufficient quality and nature that the
assertion of jurisdiction would be "presumptively reasonable.""'
The Court would then analyze the business dealings between
the parent and subsidiary, treating them as two separate and unre-
lated entities without reference to their family ties. In other words,
the analysis would be limited to the business and commercial deal-
ings between the parent and child and would not delve into their
family matters." 8 The business dealings would be evaluated to deter-
144. In Burger King, the Court referred to the litigation arising from Burger King's
termination of the franchise as "a divorce proceeding among commercial partners." Id. at
2179.
145. In order for a corporation to come into existence and continue to exist as such, the
corporation must issue shares of stock.
146. This suggestion is made with the assumption that the out-of-state corporation over
which jurisdiction is sought is sued for its own activities. See supra notes 20-24 and accompa-
nying text.
147. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2186. The assertion of jurisdiction cannot definitely be
deemed reasonable until a court concludes, through the second step of the due process analysis,
that it would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See supra
note 142.
148. For some examples of what constitutes "family matters," see footnotes 77 and 117.
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mine which activities the in-state corporation did or continued to do
on behalf of the business enterprise of the out-of-state corporation. If
the Court determined that the in-state activities were done with the
knowledge of the out-of-state corporation and that the out-of-state
corporation derived a substantial benefit from those activities,"" the
Court would conclude that the out-of-state corporation was "pre-
sumptively" amenable to suit in the forum state.
B. Jurisdictional Rule of Attribution
In evaluating the out-of-state defendant's contacts with the fo-
rum, the Court in Burger King stated that Rudzewicz's
cofranchisee's trip to Florida to satisfy the Burger King training re-
quirements could be attributed to Rudzewicz for the purpose of es-
tablishing jurisdiction. 50 The Court explained that "when commer-
cial activities are 'carried on in behalf of' an out-of-state party those
activities may sometimes be ascribed to the party, . . . at least
where he is a 'primary participan[t]' in the enterprise and has acted
purposefully in directly those activities.""' The Court cited Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington52 as the authority for this idea of
attribution. In International Shoe, the Court upheld the forum
state's exercise of jurisdiction based on the attribution of the in-state
activities of salesmen to the out-of-state defendant corporation on
whose behalf the activities were conducted. "
Based on these criteria for attribution,' it appears that attribu-
tion could have been applied in Burger King in a broader sense. The
Court described Rudzewicz's contact with the forum state in terms
of a voluntary relationship "that envisioned continuing and wide-
reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida."' 55 Alternatively, the
Court could have expressed the same idea by stating that all the
activities that Burger King had done on behalf of Rudzewicz, as well
149. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
150. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22.
151. Id.
152. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
153. Id. at 320. The idea of attribution as applied in International Shoe was expanded
in Burger King. In International Shoe, the salesmen whose activities were ascribed to the out-
of-state corporation were employees of that corporation. In Burger King, the Court ascribed
MacShara's forum state activities to Rudzewicz although MacShara and Rudzewicz had
neither formed a partnership nor a corporation at the time of those activities. In exalting
substance over form, the Court in Burger King attributed the activities of the in-state party to
the out-of-state party regardless of the label, or lack thereof, under which their relationship
existed.
154. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22. See infra text accompanying notes 164-65.
155. Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2186.
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as those it had contemplated doing pursuant to the contract, would
be attributed to Rudzewicz for the purpose of establishing minimum
contacts. Arguably, there is no real difference between stating
Rudzewicz's contact with the forum in terms of a "continuing rela-
tionship" and stating it in terms of "attribution." The benefit of
phrasing the basis of jurisdiction in terms of attribution, however, is
that the idea of attribution is applicable to all types of fact situa-
tions. 156 On the other hand, the applicability of the phrase "continu-
ing relationship," like "stream of commerce,"'157 is limited to specific
fact situations.
Justice Frankfurter articulated this idea of jurisdictional attri-
bution as applied to corporations very appropriately in his concurring
opinion in United States v. Scophony Corp."' Frankfurter stated
that "a corporation as such never transacts business and is never
found anywhere, but does 'transact business' and is 'found' some-
where by attribution to the corporation of what human beings do for
it."'5 9 Because the corporate person is in reality only a fiction, "but a
fiction to be acted upon as though it were fact,"' 06 it has no physical
presence. In the jurisdictional sense, a corporate person is present, or
has minimum contacts, wherever it transacts business."' A corporate
person can transact business, however, only vicariously through natu-
ral persons. 6 The label attached to those natural persons deter-
mines the degree of control that the corporate person has over those
natural persons, as well as the rights and duties that exist between
the corporate person, the natural persons, and third parties.' 3 The
label, however, does not affect the end result-the transaction of
business on behalf of the corporate person. Consequently, the label
attached to those natural persons-agent, employee, independent
contractor, or related corporation-through which a corporation
156. The discussion of attribution as a theory of jurisdiction is, however, limited to the
scope of this Comment.
157. The stream of commerce theory can also be expressed more generally in terms of
attribution. For example, it could be stated that every sale of the manufacturer's product made
on behalf of the manufacturer by an in-state entity would be attributed to the out-of-state
manufacturer for the purpose of establishing minimum contacts.
158. 333 U.S. 795 (1948). In granting jurisdiction over a British corporation based upon
the local operations of its American subsidiary, the Court in Scophony adopted an "economic
reality" theory based on the practical and broader business conception of engaging in any
substantial business operation.
159. Id. at 820 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
160. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U.S.
19, 24 (1930)).
161. Id. at 316.
162. Id. at 316-17.
163. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1957).
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chooses to do business should not be a relevant factor in the determi-
nation of whether an out-of-state corporation has minimum contacts
in the forum state.
The benefit of a jurisdictional theory of attribution as it applies
to related corporations, other than its widespread applicability, is
that it recognizes no distinction between related and unrelated cor-
porations and focuses the court's attention on the intent of the out-
of-state corporate defendant. To attribute the in-state activities of a
corporation to a related out-of-state corporation, there are two essen-
tial criteria. 164 First, the in-state corporation must carry on commer-
cial activity on behalf of the out-of-state corporation. Second, the
out-of-state corporation must purposefully avail itself of those in-
state activities. This purposeful availment or intent requirement can
be further broken down into two sub-elements.16 5 The out-of-state
corporation must know that the in-state activities are being done on
its behalf and the out-of-state corporation must accept the benefits
derived from those in-state activities.
A rule of attribution, as proposed in this Comment, is not a
"clear-cut jurisdictional rule." ' Rather, it is a general rule of
thumb for determining when the in-state activities of one corporation
may be attributed to an out-of-state corporation, related or unre-
lated, for the purpose of establishing that the out-of-state corpora-
tion has minimum contacts in the forum state. It is a "rule" that is
not conclusory, but one that turns upon the individual facts of each
case. 1617 Additionally, a rule of attribution is only applied at the first
step of the jurisdictional due process analysis. The determination,
through the application of the rule of attribution, that the out-of-
state corporation has minimum contacts with the forum state is only
the initial inquiry. The second step of the due process analysis re-
quires the consideration of many other factors 68 before jurisdiction
can be found to comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.1 16
9
164. Although the Supreme Court in Burger King did not "resolve the permissible
bounds of such attribution," it would not be unreasonable to propose a jurisdictional rule of
attribution based on those criteria set forth by the Court in footnote twenty-two. See Burger
King, 105 S. Ct. at 2186 n.22.
165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
166. See Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2189 n.29. See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at
319.
167. "'[Tlhe facts of each case must [always] be weighed' in determining whether per-
sonal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.'" Burger King, 105 S.
Ct. at 2189 (citing Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
168. See supra note 142.
169. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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V. Conclusion
Within the last three decades, the number of corporations that
have chosen to form a parent-subsidiary structure has increased sig-
nificantly. 170 The motives behind this corporate family formation are
grounded in part on legal and economic considerations unique to
each business sector."7 For example, in regulated businesses such as
banking and insurance, an independent corporation will turn itself
into a subsidiary and create its own parent.172 This structure is desir-
able because it allows diversification into nonregulated businesses
and lessens the grip of the respective regulatory agency and law.'73
For jurisdictional purposes, however, these motives and the resulting
corporate structure are not and should not be of concern to a court.
A structure that a corporation has voluntarily chosen for itself
should not stand in the way of a court exercising its adjudicatory
authority when it is otherwise fair and reasonable to do so.
This recent corporate trend towards subsidiaries, as well as the
increased nationalization and internationalization of commerce,
make it apparent that jurisdictional issues involving related corpora-
tions will occur even more frequently in the future. It is important,
therefore, for courts to effectively and efficiently dispose of these pro-
cedural issues. When a court is faced with a jurisdictional issue in-
volving related corporations, it should first determine why jurisdic-
tion is sought. If jurisdiction is sought over an out-of-state parent in
an attempt to hold the parent liable for the acts of its in-state sub-
sidiary, a court has a rational reason for applying an analysis that
forces the jurisdictional issue to anticipate the merits. 74 The alter
ego and agency theories previously discussed provide such an analy-
sis. Otherwise, a court should analyze the issue on the same mini-
mum contacts basis employed in other personal jurisdiction cases.
Once it has been determined that the out-of-state defendant is
being sued for its own acts, a court should disregard the family rela-
tionship between the two corporations and, instead, focus on their
business and commercial dealings. If, in analyzing this business rela-
tionship, it can be shown that the out-of-state corporation intended
to transact business in the forum state through a related in-state cor-
170. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION-A LEGAL ANALYSIS 277
(1976).
171. Id. at 280.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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poration,'17 1 then the out-of-state corporation will be "present" in the
state through attribution. The constitutional touchstone is "whether
the defendant purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the fo-
rum state.' 1 76 Consequently, the means through which an out-of-
state corporation establishes its in-state contacts-either through an
agent, an employee, an independent contractor, or a related corpora-
tion-is not relevant for personal jurisdiction purposes.
Murray E. Knudsen
175. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
176. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1985).
